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RECENT CASES
TAXATION-CORRECTION OF ASSESSMENTS--JUDICIAL REMEDIES
FOR REVIEw-The assessor for the City of Grand Forks appraised
appellant's property in an amount appellant believed to be exces-
sive.' Appellant's petition for abatement was denied by the city
council, whose decision was subsequently affirmed by the Board
of County Commissioners for Grand Forks County. On appeal, the
district court found the appraisal made by the assessor to be in
excess of the full and true value2 of the property, and ordered a
refund. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in reversing the decision
of the court below, held that a district court cannot substitute its
judgment as to valuation of property for that of the taxing authori-
ties, unless it be shown that the taxing authorities acted arbitrarily,
oppressively, or unreasonably in making their appraisal. Appeal of
Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1970).
1 The rule is well established that in the absence of fraudulent
or arbitrary conduct on the part of the assessing officer, an excessive
or disproportionate valuation for tax purposes will not be set aside
by the courts.3 The court in the instant case, faced with this issue
for the first time, chose to adhere to the rule as stated above.4
This comment will examine the legal effects of the rule adopted
in the instant case, the adequacy of institutional and procedural
arrangements in North Dakota for application of this type of admin-
istrative appeal and judicial review of assessments, and any possible
alternatives to the rule.
As a practical matter, the effect of the rule adopted in the
instant case is to restrict any judicial inquiry of an appraisal arrived
at by the assessor to the reasonableness of the assessor's actions,
and not the mathematical validity of the assessment itself.5 Justi-
fication of this approach is founded on the theory that the assessment
of property is an administrative function, and the courts should not
interfere or impose their views for those of the administrative authori-
1. The appellant believed the assessment was $9,940.00 in excess of the full and true
market value of the property.
2. The full and true value In money Is the North Dakota assessment standard. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-23-01 (1960).
3. 84 C.J.S., Taxation § 562, at 1107-11 (1954.); 51 AM. JuR., Taxation § 723, p. 666
(1944). See also People Ex Rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc., 259 N.E.2d 27 (i1.
1970).
4. Appeal of Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475, 481 (N.D. 1970).
5. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 124 W. Va. 562, 21 S.E.2d
143 (1942) ; People v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill.2d 209, 221 N.E.2d 650, 652 (1966).
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ties.6 Thus, the burden of proof necessary for the taxpayer to obtain
judicial review of an assessment, has been described as follows:
[T]he taxpayer's burden is not met by showing merely a
difference of opinion between his witnesses and the assessing
authority, and so, unless it is manifest the valuation is grossly
excessive and is a result of the will [of the assessor] and
not the judgment [of the assessor], the assessment will be
sustained.7
The dilemma facing the taxpayer seeking judicial review of
an assessment becomes even more apparent when one considers
the following rules of construction used by the courts: the assessors
valuation of property is presumed to be fair and correct," this
presumption applies to all of his acts;9 further that as long as the
assessor acts reasonably, mere errors of judgment will not warrant
judicial interference; ' 0 and finally, that valuation of property is not
an exact science, so overvaluation in itself is not enough to overcome
the assessor's determination.11
Though most courts purport to grant relief for "grossly exces-
sive over-valuation of property,"' 12 under a theory of "constructive
fraud,"'1 few cases qualify due to the degree the courts will allow
over-valuation, before it becomes grossly excessive. 14 For example,
in a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court cited in the instant case, 5
a disparity in the appraisal of the assessor of twenty-five percent
was held insufficient to warrant judicial intervention." In another
Illinois decision, a disparity of seventy-one percent was held not
to be "grossly excessive" as to amount to "constructive fraud.' ' I T
Stalder v. Board of County Commissioners,5 decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court, further illustrates the inflexibility that can result
6. Garvey Grain, Inc. v. MacDonald, 203 Kan. 1, 453 P.2d 59, 68 (1969).
7. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 257 Iowa 1359, 137 N.W.2d 246,
252 (1965).
8. See, e.g., Citizens' Committee for Fair Property Tax v. Warner, 127 Colo. 131, 254
P.2d 1005, 1010 (1953) ; State Ex. Rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, - Wis.- , 178
N.W.2d 627, 629 (1970).
9. Citizens Committee for Fair Property Tax v. Warner, 127 Colo. 131, 254 P.2d 1005,
1010 (1953) ("official regularity").
10. See, e.g., Garvey Grain, Inc. v. MacDonald, 203 Kan. 1, 453 P.2d 59, 68 (1969)
Charleston Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 190 (1945).
11. Chicago & N.W. By. v. Iowa State Tax Comn'n, 257 Iowa 1359, 137 N.W.2d 24.6,
252 (1965) ; Citizens' Committee for Fair Property Tax v. Warner, 127 Colo. 131, 254
P.2d 1005, 1010 (1953); Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. Muskegon, 346 Mich. 16, 77 N.W.2d
255, 257 (1956).
12. See Mason County Overtaxed, Inc. v. County of Mason, 834 P.2d 352, (Wash.
1963); People Ex Rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc., 259 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. 1970);
Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. Rptr. 341, 844 (1968).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Mason County Overtaxed, Inc. v. County of Mason, 84 P.2d 352 (Wash.
1963) (and cases cited therein). See aLso People v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 1l1.2d 209, 221
N.E.2d 650, 652 (1966).
15. Appeal of Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475, 482 (N.D. 1970).
16. People v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Il1.2d 376, 215 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1966).
17. People Ex Rel. Munson v. Morningside Heights, Inc., 259 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ill. 1970).
18. Stadler v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 364 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1961).
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from this rule. In Stalder, the property owner claimed excessive
valuation due to the assessor's failure to consider new and more
economical construction methods, the court admitted the assessments
were high but denied relief on the theory that the oversight by
the assessor was not in bad faith, and was a reasonable error of
judgment. 19
The court in the instant case did not attempt to distinguish at
what point an assessment could be adjudged arbitrary, or unreason-
able. Yet if the cases cited by the court are indicative of the standard
that it approved, a disparity of twelve percent in the appraisal is
not arbitrary, 20 a disparity in the appraisal of twenty-five percent
is not arbitrary,2 1 and the assessment made by the assessor is not
arbitrary without evidence of an "intentional violation of duty...
or such reckless disregard of a taxpayer's manifest rights as would
reasonably lead to an inference of intentional inequality .*..22 Other
courts have defined arbitrary and capricious action as "willful and
unreasonable action, without consideration and in disregard of the
facts or circumstances of the case, ' 23 or merely as action "without
a rational basis. ' 24
In substance, the North Dakota Supreme Court is telling the
taxpayer who is unable to prove anything beyond mere error of
judgment by the assessor, that he must seek redress from the ap-
propriate administrative authorities and not the courts. Given this
result, there still remains a major question to be answered that
the court did not direct itself to. Can the administrative authorities
meet the mandate of the court while at the same time assuring
justice to the taxpayer? One commentator has described the problem
like this:
The nature and scope of judicial review, it is submitted, must
depend on the character of the review provided in the admin-
istrative process .2
In North Dakota, the taxpayer unable to meet the strict burden
for judicial review imposed by the instant case, must protest the
valuation of his property, made by city and or county officers, to
his board of county commissioners.2 6 This has the following effect.
19. Id.
20. Appeal of Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1970).
21. People v. S.B.A. Co., 34 Ill.2d 376, 215 NE.2d 233 (1966).
22. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Detroit, 276 Mich 565, 268 N.W. 740, 743 (1936).
23. Markwardt v. County Ed. of Review, 174. N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1970) (and cases
cited therein).
24. State Board of Tax Conun'rs v. Chicago, M. St.P. & Pac. R.R., 121 Ind. App. 302,
96 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1951).
25. Hellerstein, Judifcal Review of Property Tax Assessments, 14 TAX L. RExv. 827, 349
(1959).
26. N.D. CENT. Conc § 57-23-03 (1960).
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The elected board of county commissioners, 27 with no requirement
of expertise in law or taxation, 28 engaged in managing the affairs
of the county, 29 is authorized to exercise quasi-judicial powers. 0
Further, as a result of the instant case, this board of county commis-
sioners actually sits as a court of last resort for the taxpayer unable
to gain judicial review of an assessment. Given this degree of re-
sponsibility, it has been stated that a minimal standard for review
by administrative authorities should include:
[a] fair hearing to review the action of the assessor before
a competent, impartial, and independent review board, where
he is given adequate opportunity to present his evidence and
make his arguments.,1
Boards of county commissioners may or may not meet these
minimal standards set forth above, but their ability has been repeat-
edly questioned by commentators.3 2 Thus, in regard to "impartiality"
it has been said that by the "virtue of the elective nature of their
office," the likelihood that inequities arising from political pressures
is greatly enhanced, 3 and further, that independence and impartiality
can hardly result when the "action of the local assessors is subject
to review by county boards . . . made up of officials responsible
for local budgets. ' 3 4 As noted above, board members have no required
expertise in taxation and as a recent California study pointed out,3 5
the board is apt to support the assessor who they consider to be
an authority.
Impartiality and competence aside, basic fairness, especially as
it relates to the hearing stage, requires that each agency adopt
essential procedural rules.3 6 The procedural due process required
of the North Dakota county boards is minimal at best. All that
is required is notice of hearing, hearing, and notice of the decision
reached.3 7 Evidentiary rules such as right of examination and cross-
examination, subpoena of witnesses, independent fact finding, and
testimony under oath, which are characteristic of a judicial proceed-
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-11-02 (1960).
28. Id. (commissioner need only be a resident of county).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-11-11 (1960).
30. N.D. CENT. CODs § 57-23-03 (1960).
31. Hellerstein, supra n. 25 at 349.
32. See generally, Hellerstein, supra note 25; Carr, Property Assessment: Protest,
Appeal, and Judicial Review, 17 ADMIN. L. REV. 187 (1965); Holbrook, Judicial Review
of Determinations by County Boards of Equalization, 14 So. CAL. L REv. 276 (1941);
Hunt, Administrative Procedure-An Additional Plea, 57 ILL. B. J. 464 (1969).
33. Carr, Property Assessment: Protest, Appeal, and Judicial Review, 17 ADMIN. L.
R V. 187, 193 (1965).
34. Hellerstein, supra n. 25 at 349.
35. Final Report of the Joint Interim Committee on Assessment Practices to the Cali-
fornia Lgislature, p. 38 (1959), cited in Car-, upra n. 33 at 794.
36. Comment, Administrative Procedure Legislation Among the States, 49 CORNELL L.
REV. 634, 638 (1964). See also Gigger v. Bd. of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 23 UIl.App.2d
433, 163 N.E.2d 541 (1959).
37. See N.D. CENT,. COPP 0 57-23-02, -06 (1960).
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ing, may or may not be used, but North Dakota law certainly does
not require their use. One might query why the procedures stated
above are deemed minimal for state administrative proceedings,88
but unnecessary for the county boards exercising quasi-judicial pow-
ers? It can be further questioned, if the county boards are not required
to record testimony or publish opinions,39 how will a record be ob-
tained on which to base an appeal or how will the outcome of
these decisions have any predictability? In short, the system of de-
cision making by the county boards, can not be uniform in its decisions
or procedures. The potential consequences of the courts approach
have been put like this:
A fair hearing before an impartial reviewer is indispensable
if the citizenry are to feel, whether they agree or disagree
with the decision, that they have had a fair hearing and the
property tax system, too, effectively operates as government
by law and not merely by the caprice or favoritism of the
local assessor.40
The North Dakota statute giving the boards of county commis-
sioners the power to abate "invalid, inequitable or unjust assess-
ments" provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by any decision of
said board of county commissioners may appeal to the district court.
4 . ." The statute provides no burden of proof or other criteria
for effecting the appeal. Thus in the instant casb, the court had
the choice to apply either a strict standard of judicial review, as
they did, or a broad standard of judicial review, which they did
not discuss. It is submitted that a broad standard of judicial review,
for which authority exists,4 2 would have been more desirable con-
sidering the lack of administrative machinery in North Dakota.
In Minnesota, findings of fact in tax cases by the trial court,
if reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole, must be sustained
upon review.4 8 Thus where an assessor's appraisal was $19,350.00,
and the trial court after hearing the evidence presented by both
sides, fixed the amount at $14,500.00, the valuation of the trial court
was sustained on review.44 This approach is readily adaptable to
North Dakota, in that administrative review could first be exhausted,
with the court acting as a final safeguard for the taxpayer.
38. North Dakota enacted a comprehensive state Administrative Procedure Act in 1941.
This act is limited in scope to those agencies having "state-wide jurisdiction". N.D. CENT.
COD § 28-32-01 (1960).
39. Carr, aupra n. 33 at 198-199.
40. Hellersteln, supra n. 25 at 352.
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-23-03 (Supp. 1969).
42. See discussion ifra.
43. See Alstores Realty, Inc. v. State, -- Minn.-, 176 N.W.2d 112, 118 (1970).
44. Nelson v. County of Meeker, 285 Minn. 527, 172 N.W.2d 758 (1969).
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Alabama, by statute45 and case law'4 6 has also developed a
broad standard for judicial review of tax assessments. The court
is authorized to decide "both as to the legality of the assessment
and the amount thereof."4 7 The Supreme Court of Alabama in
a recent decision, stated that the appellant only must sufficiently
show that the assessment was incorrect, to sustain his burden on
judicial review.4 8
There remains yet another choice that could be used to change
the result of the decision in the instant case. That choice is for
the Legislature to take. The Legislature has at least three courses
of action that could be taken. First, it could by statute, apply the
Alabama approach49 mentioned above. This choice would alleviate
the necessity of reorganizing the administrative procedure of the
county boards. Second, the State Administrative Procedure Act 50
could be made applicable to the county boards. This choice would
at least give hearings and their procedure courtroom formality.
Third, a totally new system could be initiated. This alternative could
be in the form of independent tax review boards, 51 now found in
many of the states.
In conclusion, it is imperative that action be taken to alleviate
the situation created by the instant case. One can only query how
an informed Supreme Court could reach a result that has such po-
tential for injustice. However, it matters very little if this defect
is remedied by the court or legislature, as long as action is taken.
The taxpayers of North Dakota deserve a more equitable system
of review of property tax assessments than their Supreme Court
has chosen to give them.
STEVEN L. WOOD
LICENSING-SALES TAX-RIGHT OF A STATE TO LEVY A SALES TAX
ON ITS OWN SUBCONTRACTOR-The plaintiffs in this case are the
executive vice president of the Minnesota Asphalt Pavement Associ-
ation and a highway construction company. Defendants are the com-
missioner of highways, commissioner of taxation, and the state audi-
45. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 14.0 (1958).46. Monroe Bond and Mortgage Co. v. State, 254 Ala. 278, 48 So.2d 431 (1950).
47. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 140- (1958).
48. State v. City Wholesale Grocery Co., 283 Ala. 426, 218 So.2d 140 (1969).
49. See discussion aupra.
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-01 (1960).
51. (Independent Tax Review Boards typically consist of 3 to 5 members, with diverse
political affiliations, who have a required degree of expertise in Taxation Law, and are
given quasi-Judicial powers to hear tax appeals. See, e.g., Kansas K.S.A. 74-2433 (1969),
and New Jersey N.J.S.A. 54:2-3 (1960).
